Authored by Fathan Bariqi Dewangga, 3rd Year International Relations student of UPN Veteran Jakarta

Abstract

This study investigates Japan's negotiating approach for the 2025 US-Japan trade deal under asymmetric power situations. While President Donald J. Trump used tariff threats and coercion to secure concessions, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's administration used "investment diplomacy" to protect politically sensitive industries like automobiles, semiconductors, robotics, and pharmaceuticals. To offset domestic political risks and retain its industrial core, Japan committed $550 billion on infrastructure, defense, and industrial projects in the United States, replacing trade liberalization. The study reveals how weaker governments may deal with asymmetry by making selected compromises, reframing issues, and relying on international institutions. The 2025 agreement thus highlights both the coercive potential of U.S. trade policy and the strategic resilience of Japan’s economic diplomacy, with implications for future middle-power responses to coercive bilateralism

Introduction

The September 2025 US-Japan trade deal is one of the most significant bilateral economic agreements since the early 2000s. The agreement, reached between President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, came amid increased “America First” trade policies in Washington and political turmoil in Tokyo. To extract big concessions, Trump’s government proposed wide tariffs, threatening up to 25% on Japanese goods, including autos. The final deal, announced in July 2025, decreased the tariff threats to a 15% baseline rate and obtained a $550 billion investment package from Japan in US infrastructure, defense, and manufacturing, as well as enhanced US agricultural and defense export access.

Trump’s return to power in 2025 reignited a coercive bilateralism. From the start, his “America First” rhetoric stressed reducing big US trade imbalances and rebuilding American industry, rejecting numerous international restraints in favor of unilateral actions. The administration’s plan relied mainly on tariffs as a negotiation weapon rather than a protective barrier. By focusing on sectors that are strongly connected with Japan’s export economy autos, parts, and strategic goods the US used its asymmetrical strength to force Tokyo to make a costly choice: accept concessions or suffer more economic devastation.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s government faced severe internal limitations. Ishiba, who became LDP leader in September 2024 and prime minister in October 2024, took office amid falling party performance and rising public anger. Following general elections and upper-house defeats, his coalition lost control of both chambers of the Diet.1 With minimal political capital, Ishiba’s administration was especially sensitive to demands that may elicit significant local resistance, notably from industrial lobbies, agricultural sectors, and a public apprehensive of giving in to foreign pressure.2 The car, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical industries were particularly troubled, both economically and politically.

greement reached in September 2025 represented a series of compromises made under pressure. Under its conditions, the US dropped its proposed high duties to a 15% baseline for many Japanese goods. In exchange, Japan agreed to a major $550 billion investment in US projects and expanded its markets for US agricultural, defense, and industrial commodities, including additional purchases of rice and energy items.3 Importantly, Japan was able to protect its most sensitive industries from forced liberalization, replacing financial investments and acquisitions with greater regulatory or tariff concessions in crucial areas.

This conclusion begs the question: did Japan succumb to asymmetric pressure, or did Ishiba’s administration consciously prioritize investment diplomacy above trade liberalization to protect its key industries? On the one hand, the size of the investment commitment and the prospect of tariff reductions hint to a big US success; on the other hand, the maintenance of regulatory autonomy and safeguards in cars, semiconductors, and medicines suggests Japanese initiative.

This study tackles the research question: How did Japan bargain under asymmetric conditions in 2025, and what does this tell us about the long-term viability of its trade diplomacy? More particularly, it investigates the relationship between US coercive power and Japanese strategic adaptability, focusing on how investment was employed as an alternative form of concession.

While structural power plainly benefited the United States, Japan maintained its key sectors and reframed its concessions through what might be called investment diplomacy. Given internal constraints, Ishiba’s administration chose to give what was less politically costly: capital outflows and selective market access rather than total liberalization in sensitive industries. The outcome illustrates both Japan’s sensitivity to coercive economic coercion and its capability for resistance.

By evaluating the 2025 US-Japan trade deal in this perspective, this research adds to the literature on asymmetric bargaining by demonstrating how weaker parties can retain agency through replacement methods. It also contributes to studies of Japanese economic and trade policy by demonstrating continuity with previous measures for mitigating foreign pressure, whether through voluntary export limitations, offshore manufacturing, or investment pledges, while maintaining industrial centers. In an era of increased receptivity to unilateral trade measures, Japan’s reaction in 2025 is likely to have far-reaching implications for middle powers facing similar challenges.

Theoretical Framework: Asymmetry and Bargaining Power

Understanding the 2025 US-Japan trade agreement necessitates setting it within the framework of unequal interdependence and bargaining strength. According to Keohane and Nye (1977), dependency between states is rarely balanced, with one side relying more on the connection than the other. Even among close allies, uneven vulnerabilities influence the negotiating climate. The disparity in commercial relations between the United States and Japan is due to market size and leverage. The United States has a large customer base and the ability to impose tariffs and quotas, but Japan’s export-driven economy is strongly reliant on consistent access to the American market. This mismatch offers Washington a structural advantage, allowing it to use trade policy as a tool of coercion rather than just protection.According to asymmetric bargaining theory, stronger nations use such discrepancies to dictate outcomes through threats, issue-linkage, and side payments (Lake, 2009; Odell, 2000). However, the weaker spouse retains some degree of agency. Vulnerable nations may safeguardessential businesses, postpone or reduce payments, and reinterpret compliance with other types of compensation. The literature on economic statecraft strengthens this logic. Hirschman (1945) and Baldwin (1985) demonstrate that trade policy is fundamentally political: mechanisms such as tariffs, quotas, and investment treaties operate as levers of influence rather than mere instruments of exchange. Side payments or compensation arrangements, financial transfers, investment promises, or security guarantees can replace politically problematic concessions, allowing weaker nations to comply without jeopardizing domestic interests.When applied to the discussions between Trump and Ishiba, this approach exposes a pattern of “managed asymmetry.” On the US side, the Trump administration attempted to utilize its leverage by slapping tariffs of up to 25% on Japanese automobiles and other vital exports, threatening to escalate until Tokyo agreed to new conditions. This strategy ignored international organizations like the World Trade Organization in favor of bilateral pressure, which is consistent with Trump’s larger “America First” ideology (White House, 2025). The United States combined issues agriculture, defense exports, and infrastructure investment to extract a comprehensive bundle of advantages, combining market access with capital inflows.Japan’s policy, however, did not equate to easy surrender. Faced with internal limits and the political importance of its car and semiconductor industries, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s administration prioritized protecting these sectors from reform. Rather of lowering tariffs in crucial areas, Tokyo committed to invest $550 billion in US infrastructure and defense industries, as well as limit agricultural market openings (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry [METI], 2025). This strategy enabled Japan to meet US expectations for demonstrable “wins” while maintaining its economic core and political credibility at home.

Baca juga:  Pengertian Organisasi Internasional: Karakteristik, Fungsi, Peran

U.S. Structural Advantage and Negotiating Posture

The United States started the 2025 discussions with Japan with a clear structural advantage. President Donald J. Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 reignited the “America First” trade nationalism that characterized his first term.4 Skepticism of multilateral organizations like as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which had previously limited US trade unilateralism, was central to this new strategy.5 According to Trump, multilateralism reduced American leverage and allowed countries to “free-ride” market access and security obligations. As a result, the administration made bilateral agreements the focal point of its trade strategy, presenting talks as direct battles in which the greater American economy could wringbetter terms from its partners.6

Reactivating Section 232 national security tariffs was a significant component of this approach. Section 232, which was originally justified as a means of preserving US national security, was utilized seldom in previous decades but became a significant instrument during Trump’s first term7. In 2025, his administration expanded its applicability to Japanese autos, steel, and electronics, which are the backbone of Japan’s export industry, boosting taxes to as high as 25%. For Japan, these tariffs posed not just an economic danger but also a political problem. The car sector is one of Japan’s major jobs and a symbol of the country’s postwar economic achievement, while supply networks for steel and electronics are inextricably linked to high-tech exports8.

Trump’s negotiation strategy aimed to increase coercive pressure by characterizing Japanese trade policies as “unfair” and “predatory”9. This narrative appealed to domestic political constituents, notably farmers and manufacturers in Midwestern and Rust Belt swing states who had been critical to Trump’s victory alliance. By stressing Japan’s ostensibly tight markets, Trump positioned himself as the protector of American workers against foreign exploitation, a story that strengthened support for strong methods at home.

The administration’s goals for the 2025 discussions were threefold. First, Washington requested more access for US agricultural exports, with cattle, maize, soybeans, and dairy products topping the list of commodities it wished to bring into Japan’s fiercely protected market10. Second, the US sought to open Japan’s defense procurement to American companies. By connecting trade discussions to the US-Japan military partnership, the administration attempted to obtain long-term contracts for US defense compworker11. Finally, Trump urged Tokyo for a record investment commitment in US infrastructure and industry, citing such pledges as proof that his administration was providing “a better deal for American workers.”

Beyond tariffs, issue-linkage was a key component of Trump’s plan. By combining agricultural access, defense procurement, and investment promises into a single package, the administration raised the penalty of noncompliance for Japan while increasing the possible political gains at home12. This multidimensional negotiation technique offered US negotiators the freedom to claim victory on several fronts and put them into a cohesive narrative of regainedAmerican clout.Although tariffs on Japanese imports were dropped from 25% to 15% still higher than pre 2025 levels Washington negotiated a record-breaking $550 billion Japanese investment guarantee in US infrastructure, industrial, and defense projects. This was followed by increased quotas and access for American agriculture and defense businesses to Japan’s procurement markets13. While Tokyo was able to retain certain safeguards for its most sensitive industries, the size of its investment commitment reflected Washington’s strong negotiation methods.

Japan’s Strategy in the 2025 U.S.–Japan Trade Negotiations

Japan entered the 2025 discussions with the United States in a position of significant structural vulnerability. The return of President Donald J. Trump and his resurgent “America First” trade nationalism significantly changed the negotiation environment. Faced with the danger of broad duties under Section 232 and the potential erosion of its US export base, Tokyo devised a multifaceted plan that included sectoral protection, financial side payments, and careful domestic framing to minimize asymmetry and avoid a worst-case situation.

Strategic Priorities: Protecting Core Industries

At the center of Japan’s bargaining strategy is the safeguarding of its car sector. Automobiles account for roughly one-fifth of Japan’s overall exports to the United States, supporting hundreds of thousands of domestic employment, including a complex network of suppliers and regional economies that rely on auto manufacture and exports14. For decades, the automobile sector has also represented Japan’s technological superiority and worldwide competitiveness. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s government recognized that giving up on this industry would result in major political reaction, not just from company executives and labor organizations, but also from the general population, which sees automobile exports as vital to Japan’s economic identity.

Beyond automobiles, Tokyo classified electronics, robots, and pharmaceuticals as “strategic and future-critical industries.” Semiconductors underlie Japan’s objectives in artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing; robotics serves as the foundation of its demographic adaption plan; and medicines are critical to both public health security and technical competitiveness. Ishiba’s government emphasized the importance of these businesses for both national security and economic viability, citing past experiences with US pressure on Japan’s technical sectors15. As a result, protecting these industries against significant deregulation became a red line in the discussions.

Tactics to Mitigate U.S. Pressure

In order to maintain these red lines, Japan traded politically costly tariff concessions for large-scale cash commitments. The most conspicuous of these was a $550 billion investment commitment in US infrastructure, industrial, and technological projects unmatched package in the history of bilateral economic ties. This “side payment” technique enabled Ishiba to provide Washington with a real gain while preserving Japan’s trade defenses. The deal was portrayed as a mutually beneficial industrial partnership, rather than a concession obtained under duress. In agriculture, Japan provided relatively limited opportunities, focused on beef, maize, and soybeans at levels essentially similar to its previous obligations under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This strategy allowed Tokyo to claim continuity with previous accords rather than capitulating to new demands. As a result, the government minimized new exposure to politically sensitive farming industries while also providing the Trump administration with a headline success16.

Baca juga:  Diplomasi Humana: Menenun Jaringan Empati untuk Masa Depan Dunia

Domestic Politics and the Need for Dual Messaging

The Ishiba government’s approach reflected both economic concerns and internal political restrictions. The prime minister confronted a divided Diet and a cautious public weary of Trump’s combative attitude. In this situation, looking excessively combative or meek would have been politically harmful. Ishiba therefore attempted to demonstrate strength toward Washington while also demonstrating practical actions to maintain the alliance and economic stability.

Securing respite from the anticipated 25% car tariffs was critical for calming industry lobbies and faction leaders within the government Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). By successfully negotiating a partial pullback to 15%, Ishiba demonstrated that his administration could maintain Japan’s economic lifeblood. At the same time, he described the $550 billion investment plan as “Japan shaping U.S. supply chains,” a proactive industrial collaboration approach rather than a show of weakness17. This framing served to silence nationalist detractors who might otherwise have accused him of betraying Japan’s interests.

Diplomatic Backdrop: Multilateral Anchoring

Parallel to the bilateral discussions, Tokyo issued a subtle but forceful message that it remained genuinely committed to multilateral trade agreements. Japan’s sustained involvement in the CPTPP and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) served as a reminder that the United States was not its only market. This diversification approach provided Japan some power by proving that it had alternate routes to market access and supply chain resiliency. Ishiba’s team also strengthened connections with ASEAN economies, which boosted Japan’s regional economic impact18. These multilateral anchors increased Japan’s bargaining leverage in subtle ways. Although the Trump administration expressly rejected multilateralism as a restraint on US action, American negotiators were concerned that undue pressure might push Tokyo closer to Europe or the larger Asia-Pacific trade grouping. This backdrop enabled Japan to avoid more broad compromises and keep the discussions focused on areas where a narrow agreement was possible.

Outcome: Managing Asymmetry, Avoiding the Worst Case

The results of the 2025 discussions demonstrated Japan’s capacity to handle structural imbalance through deliberate prioritizing and tactical flexibility. By safeguarding its automotive, semiconductor, robotics, and pharmaceutical industries, Tokyo averted the collapse of its export basis and secured its technical future. The $550 billion investment plan, while unparalleled in magnitude, enabled Japan to meet US political imperatives without jeopardizing its own trade defenses. Limited agricultural openness and moderate defense procurement reforms made sufficient concessions to obtain relief from the most severe tariffs.Ultimately, Japan achieved what may be described as “damage limitation plus strategic positioning.” It averted the worst-case scenario of full 25% tariffs and broad concessions across its core industries while keeping a constructive approach with Washington. This decision maintained the legitimacy of the US-Japan alliance, protected critical sectors of the Japanese economy, and demonstrated Tokyo’s ability to negotiate asymmetric discussions with a much bigger partner.

The Outcome and Significance of the 2025 U.S.–Japan Trade Deal

The September 2025 U.S.-Japan trade deal yielded a mixed but instructive conclusion that offers light on the mechanics of negotiating under asymmetry. On the surface, the US obtained significant concessions from Japan: tariffs were reduced from 25% to 15%, Tokyo committed to an unprecedented $550 billion investment package in US infrastructure and manufacturing, and new quotas for American agricultural exports were established, along with the partial opening of Japan’s defense procurement market.19 These headline victories enabled President Donald Trump to present the agreement as proof of his “America First” policy, arguing that even long-standing friends could be forced to accept Washington’s demands. American farmers and defense contractors emerged as clear beneficiaries of this new arrangement, with enhanced access to the Japanese market and preferential treatment for U.S. suppliers.

However, the Japanese side of the ledger has a more convoluted narrative. For Tokyo, the accord avoided the far more devastating scenario of facing 25% tariffs on vehicles and electronics, which would have decimated Japan’s most significant export industries. By substituting large-scale investment promises for further economic liberalization, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s administration protected semiconductors, robotics, and medicines from US pressure. Domestically, this strategy allowed Ishiba to argue that Japan had protected its “national economic core” while still complying to US demands. Tokyo characterized its concessions as proactive rather than capitulatory, presenting the investment package as a commitment to alliance resilience and a strategic push to change U.S. supply chains.20

Short-Term Implications: Divergent Victories

In the near term, the conclusion was a political victory for Trump. He could point to tangible gains more agricultural sales, opportunities in defense procurement, and a major investment commitment to demonstrate that his form of forced bilateralism “worked.” The winners inside the United States were clear: agricultural exporters earned increased quotas for beef, maize, and soybeans, while military businesses were positioned to win contracts through pilot programs that opened up the Japanese procurement market. This boosted support among constituents in the Midwest and defense-oriented areas, strengthening Trump’s electoral alliance.21

For Japan, the agreement gave respite, but at a cost. The partial lowering of tariffs to 15% preserves market access for car exporters while avoiding a supply-chain disaster. Protecting semiconductors and other key sectors helped to keep Japan’s technical backbone intact. However, the $550 billion investment plan incurred significant budgetary and political burdens. Critics in Japan questioned whether such enormous outside obligations could be justified during local economic woes, and opposition parties presented the contract as evidence of Japan’s reliance on US economic pressure.

Medium to Long Term Implications: Shifts in Strategy and Order

The medium- and long-term ramifications go beyond bilateral trade. For the United States, the agreement strengthened its image as a hegemonic power eager to use economic coercion, even against its closest friends. This created new concerns about the credibility of US leadership within the liberal international order. If Washington can apply 25% tariffs and force major concessions from Japan, other allies may ask whether multilateral norms provide adequate protection. Such attitudes risk weakening the credibility of US leadership and hastening the shift to other trade and investment networks.22

For Japan, the 2025 experience may spur attempts to diversify its economic partnerships and strengthen its commitment to multilateral frameworks. Tokyo has previously been a key architect of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and a driving force behind the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. Following the Trump-Ishiba agreement, Japanese authorities expressed a desire to strengthen trade and investment links with Southeast Asia, India, and Europe in order to limit exposure to U.S. stock market volatility. This diversity is more than just economic; it serves as a geopolitical hedge against the unpredictable nature of future US administrations and the precedent of coercive bilateralism. Another impact is that Japan may now be viewed as a willing participant in future bilateral agreements. Tokyo risks creating a precedent that future US administrations may use. Japanese trade diplomacy faces significant problems regarding how to maintain credible red lines while avoiding confrontation with a structurally stronger partner.

Baca juga:  Pentingnya Diplomasi Komersial bagi Sebuah Negara

Broader Implications for International Political Economy

From the standpoint of international political economics, the 2025 agreement exemplifies “managed asymmetry.” The United States used structural power to define the agenda and secure key concessions, while Japan maintained agency through strategic prioritizing and reframing. Tokyo illustrated how a middle power might remain resilient in the face of coercive influence by diverting concessions into investment rather than liberalizing its most sensitive industries.

However, the elimination of the WTO and other multilateral organizations indicates a further deterioration of institutional trade governance. Both sides negotiated outside of the multilateral framework, upholding the precedence of ad hoc bilateral agreements above established standards and dispute-resolution processes. This degradation has ramification beyond US-Japan ties, as other countries may now be tempted to seek or oppose similar bilateral agreements, further fragmenting the global trade system.

To summarize, the September 2025 US-Japan trade deal serves as a case study in asymmetric negotiation and economic statecraft. It highlights the ongoing vulnerability of export-dependent countries when confronted with coercive trade policies imposed by larger partners. However, it also emphasizes the measures open to weaker players, such as protecting key sectors, replacing side payments, influencing domestic politics, and retaining international anchoring. Thus, the accord demonstrates both the fragility and suppleness of Japan’s economic diplomacy in an era of coercive bilateralism.

Conclusion

The 2025 Trump-Ishiba trade pact exemplifies the ongoing mechanics of negotiation under asymmetry. Armed with tariff threats and a unilateral negotiating posture, the United States was able to extract significant concessions from Japan, including unprecedented investments and extended market access for agriculture and defense sectors. From this perspective, the agreement looks to confirm the fundamental imbalance between the two economies.

However, the finding also shows that asymmetry does not imply helplessness. Japan retained its industrial foundation by putting autos, electronics, and sophisticated manufacturing first. Tokyo’s substitution of financial investment for politically sensitive trade liberalization demonstrates a controlled asymmetry strategy: it conceded where it could bear the expense while protecting industries important to its economic future. Ishiba’s leadership averted the worst consequences of coercive bilateralism while retaining a narrative of alliance participation rather than submission.

The implications are two fold. For US-Japan ties, the agreement highlights both the vulnerability of relying on force and the tenacity of a partner willing to protect its autonomy. For the global trading order, the pact represents a further weakening of multilateralism in favor of transactional bilateralism. Finally, the 2025 example indicates that, while structural power tilts the playing field, strategic middle powers such as Japan have significant potential to manage asymmetry, a lesson that will likely define the future of economic diplomacy in an era of disputed global governance.

Notes

  1. Why Another Japanese Prime Minister Resigned—and What Comes Next for Japan. TIME. https://time.com/7315284/shigeru-ishiba-japan-prime-minister-resignation-ldp-future-analysis-explainer/
    ↩︎
  2. Govella, K. (2025, September 9). New documents reveal next steps for U.S.–Japan trade deal. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-documents-reveal-next-steps-us-japan-trade-deal ↩︎
  3. The White House. (2025, September 4). Implementing the United States–Japan Agreement [Executive order]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/implementing-the-united-states-japan-agreement/
    ↩︎
  4. Bown, C. P., & Kolb, M. (2025, January 20). Trump’s trade war timeline: An up-to-date guide [PDF]. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf

    ↩︎
  5. Baldwin, D. A., & Kapstein, E. B. (2020). Economic Statecraft: New Edition. Princeton University Press. ↩︎
  6. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S., Jr. (2011). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. ↩︎
  7. Bown, C. P. (2020, February 4). Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading out of control. Trade and Investment Policy Watch, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2020/trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-cascading-out
    ↩︎
  8. Reference Materials for the Third Report of the Committee on New Direction of Economic and Industrial Policies. (2024, June). Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/shin_kijiku/pdf/20240607_6.pdf ↩︎
  9. Irwin, D. A. (2017). Introduction. In Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy (pp. 1-27). University of Chicago Press. https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13850/c13850.pdf ↩︎
  10. The White House. (2025, September 4). Implementing the United States–Japan Agreement [Executive order] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/implementing-the-united-states-japan-agreement
    ↩︎
  11. Hirschman, A. O. (1945). National power and the structure of foreign trade [PDF]. University of California Press. https://dspace.gipe.ac.in/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10973/29303/GIPE-026809.pdf ↩︎
  12. Baldwin, D. A., & Kapstein, E. B. (2020). Economic Statecraft (New Edition). Princeton University Press ↩︎
  13. The White House. (2025, July 23). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump secures unprecedented U.S.–Japan strategic trade and investment agreement. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-unprecedented-u-s-japan-strategic-trade-and-investment-agreement/ ↩︎
  14. Reference Materials for the Third Report of the Committee on New Direction of Economic and Industrial Policies. (2024, June). Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/shin_kijiku/pdf/20240607_6.pdf ↩︎
  15. Irwin, D. A. (2017). Introduction. In Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy (pp. 1-27). University of Chicago Press. https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13850/c13850.pdf ↩︎
  16. The White House. (2025, July 23). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump secures unprecedented U.S.–Japan strategic trade and investment agreement. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-unprecedented-u-s-japan-strategic-trade-and-investment-agreement/ ↩︎
  17. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2011). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. ↩︎
  18. Baldwin, D. A., & Kapstein, E. B. (2020). Economic Statecraft (New Edition). Princeton University Press. ↩︎
  19. The White House. (2025, July 23). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump secures unprecedented U.S.–Japan strategic trade and investment agreement. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-pre ↩︎
  20. Reference Materials for the Third Report of the Committee on New Direction of Economic and Industrial Policies. (2024, June). Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/shin_kijiku/pdf/20240607_6.pdf ↩︎
  21. Baldwin, D. A., & Kapstein, E. B. (2020). Economic Statecraft (New Edition). Princeton University Press. ↩︎
  22. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2011). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. ↩︎

References

Baldwin, D. A., & Kapstein, E. B. (2020). Economic statecraft (New edition). Princeton University Press.

Bown, C. P. (2020, February 4). Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading out of control. Trade and Investment Policy Watch, Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2020/trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-cascading-out 

Bown, C. P., & Kolb, M. (2025, January 20). Trump’s trade war timeline: An up-to-date guide [PDF]. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf 

Govella, K. (2025, September 9). New documents reveal next steps for U.S.–Japan trade deal Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-documents-reveal-next-steps-us-japan-trade-deal 

Hirschman, A. O. (1945). National power and the structure of foreign trade [PDF]. University of California Press. https://dspace.gipe.ac.in/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10973/29303/GIPE-026809.pdf 

Irwin, D. A. (2017). Introduction. In Clashing over commerce: A history of U.S. trade policy (pp. 1–27). University of Chicago Press. https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c13850/c13850.pdf 

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S., Jr. (2011). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Longman.

Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. (2024, June). Reference materials for the third report of the committee on new direction of economic and industrial policies. Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/shin_kijiku/pdf/20240607_6.pdf 

The White House. (2025, July 23). Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump secures unprecedented U.S.–Japan strategic trade and investment agreement. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-unprecedented-u-s-japan-strategic-trade-and-investment-agreement/ 

The White House. (2025, September 4). Implementing the United States–Japan Agreement [Executive order]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/implementing-the-united-states-japan 

Bagikan ini: